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Abstract
The enforcement of access control policies using cryptographic primitives has been studied for over
30 years. When symmetric cryptographic primitives are used, each protected resource is encrypted
and only authorized users are given the decryption key. Hence, users may require many keys. In
most schemes in the literature, keys are derived from a single key explicitly assigned to the user
and publicly available information. Recent work has challenged this design by developing schemes
that do not require public information, the trade-off being that a user may require more than one
key. However, these new schemes, which require a chain partition of the partially ordered set on
which the access control policy is based, generally require more keys than necessary. Moreover, no
algorithm is known for determining the best chain partition to use. In this paper we define the
notion of a tree-based cryptographic enforcement scheme, which, like chain-based schemes, requires
no public information but simultaneously has lower storage requirements. We formally establish that
the strong security properties of recent chain-based schemes are preserved by tree-based schemes, and
provide an efficient construction for deriving a tree-based enforcement scheme from a given policy
that minimizes the number of keys required.
1 Introduction
Access control is a fundamental security service in modern computing systems. Informally, an access
control system filters attempts by users to interact with protected resources, only allowing those inter-
actions that are authorized by a policy, which is configured by the resource owner(s). Implementations
of access control in software are vulnerable to compromise of the machine hosting the software. More-
over, such enforcement mechanisms do not work when protected resources are stored by an untrusted or
semi-trusted third party, as is increasingly common.
In some situations, therefore, we may wish to use cryptographic techniques to enforce some form of
access control. Such an approach is useful when data objects have the following characteristics: read
often, by many users; written once, or rarely, by the owner of the data; and transmitted over unprotected
networks. In such circumstances, protected data (objects) are encrypted and authorized users are given
the appropriate cryptographic keys. When cryptographic enforcement is used, the problem we must
address is the efficient and accurate distribution of encryption keys to authorized users.
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of interest in key encrypting or key assignment
schemes. In such schemes, a user is given a secret value – typically a single key – which enables the
user to derive some collection of encryption keys which decrypt the objects for which she is authorized.
Key derivation is performed using the secret value and some information made publicly available by the
scheme administrator. These schemes are particularly suitable for policies that can be represented in
terms of information flow.
Ideally, such a scheme should minimize the amount of public information and the time required to
derive a key. Unsurprisingly, it is not possible to realize both objectives simultaneously, so trade-offs have
1
been sought. Most schemes in the literature assume that each user is supplied with a single key from
which other keys are derived with the help of some information published by the scheme administrator
(see [9] for a survey of such schemes). In 2010, Crampton et al. [8] introduced a new type of scheme
in which users may receive several keys. The significant advantage of this scheme is that no public
information is required. Moreover, the simplicity of the underlying structure of the scheme makes it
possible to prove the scheme possesses very strong security properties [11].
An information flow policy is defined by a partially ordered set X and a function mapping users and
resources to elements in X . Most key assignment schemes are derived directly from X . The innovation
introduced by Crampton et al. was to consider a partition of X into chains (or total orders). It is
particularly easy to work with chains, but the partition breaks some of the “connectivity” of the partial
ordering. These breaks are “repaired” by issuing more than one key to some users. However, one question
that remains open is how best to choose the chain partition of a partially ordered set: there may be many
such partitions and different choices may lead to chain partition schemes with different characteristics.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to work with trees, rather than chains, without reintroducing
the need for public information, resulting in much more space-efficient key assignment. We define a tree-
based, cryptographic enforcement scheme and provide a rigorous construction for such schemes from a
given partially ordered set. We identify a number of different parameters that may be important in
the context of a tree-based enforcement scheme. In particular, we consider the total number of keys
that may be required in such a scheme and prove that a tree-based enforcement scheme with a minimal
number of keys can be constructed in time O(|X |2). We show that a tree-based enforcement scheme
for a given X will typically require fewer keys than a chain-based scheme. Moreover, we present an
efficient algorithm for computing the best choice of tree from the information flow policy, in contrast to
chain-based methods (which assume that a chain partition is given).
Our approach is based on constructing a weighted directed acyclic graph fromX and then constructing
a minimum weight spanning out-tree from the graph. We establish a number of results about this out-tree
that are likely to provide the foundation for further study of tree-based enforcement schemes.
In the next section, we introduce notation, relevant background material and related work. Then, in
Sec. 3, we define a tree-based enforcement scheme, provide a method for constructing such schemes for
a given information flow policy, and prove that all the resulting schemes have the property of strong key
indistinguishability. In Sec. 4, we address the problem of finding a tree-based enforcement scheme that
minimizes the total number of keys required to enforce a given policy, culminating in a polynomial-time
algorithm for computing such a scheme. We conclude the paper with a summary of our contributions
and some suggestions for future work. Those proofs that are useful in understanding our constructions
are given in the body of the paper. The remainder, including the security proof for our construction
(which extends an earlier proof by Freire et al. [11]), are in the appendix.
2 Background and Related Work
In this paper, we consider the cryptographic enforcement of access control policies. In particular, we
focus on the enforcement of information flow policies using symmetric cryptographic primitives.1
2.1 Definitions and Notation
A directed graph (or digraph) G = (V (G), E(G)) is defined by a vertex set V (G) and an arc set E(G) ⊆
V (G)×V (G). An arc in E(G) is written in the form xy, where x, y ∈ V (G). A directed path is a sequence
of arcs v1v2, v2v3, . . . , vp−2vp−1, vp−1vp, which we may also write as the sequence of vertices v1v2 . . . vp
through which the path passes. We write x  G y if there exists a directed path from x to y in G. For
all x ∈ V (G), we define x G x.
The in-degree of a vertex v ∈ V (G) is defined to be the number of arcs of the form uv in E(G). Given
an undirected rooted tree, we may orient each edge in such a way that the root has in-degree 0 and all
other vertices have in-degree 1; the resulting (acyclic) digraph is called an out-tree. Thus if a directed
path exists between a pair of two vertices in an out-tree then it is unique. H is a spanning subgraph of
a graph G if V (H) = V (G). A spanning out-tree is a spanning subgraph that is an out-tree.
1There exists a large body of work on the enforcement of attribute-based policies using asymmetric cryptographic
primitives, notably attribute-based encryption [6, 12].
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A partially ordered set or poset is a pair (X,6), where 6 is a binary, reflexive, anti-symmetric,
transitive relation. Given a poset (X,6), we write x < y if x 6 y and x 6= y; and we may write x > y if
y 6 x. We write x⋖ y and say y covers x if x < y and there does not exist z ∈ X such that x < z < y.
We say x is incomparable to y, denoted x q y, if x 6 y and y 6 x. We say Y ⊆ X is an antichain if
for all x, y ∈ Y , either x = y or x q y: Y is a maximum antichain if |Y | > |Z| for every other antichain
Z ⊆ X ; the width of X is the cardinality of a maximum antichain.
Given a poset (X,6), we define the graph H = (X,E0), where xy ∈ E0 if and only if x ⋗ y. H is
called the Hasse diagram of (X,6) and is a directed acyclic graph. A Hasse diagram of a simple poset
is shown in Fig. 1 (on page 4). We may also define the graph H∗ = (X,E∗0 ), where xy ∈ E
∗
0 if and only
if x > y. The graph H∗ is obtained by taking the transitive closure of H .
An information flow policy is defined by a partially ordered set of security labels (X,6), a set of users
U , a set of (protected) objects O, and a security function λ : U ∪ O → X . We say u ∈ U is authorized
to read o ∈ O if λ(u) > λ(o) [5].
2.2 Basic Methods of Cryptographic Enforcement
A natural way to enforce an information flow policy is to define a cryptographic key κ(x) for each x ∈ X ,
encrypt object o with κ(λ(o)) and give u (or enable u to derive) all keys κ(x) such that x 6 λ(u).
More specifically, let G = (X,E(G)) be an acyclic directed graph such that E0 ⊆ E(G) ⊆ E∗0 . Then
the transitive closure of G is equal to H∗ and x  H y if and only if x  G y. By publishing key
derivation information for each arc in E(G), it is possible to derive κ(y) from κ(x) if x G y. Thus, the
total amount of key derivation information required is proportional to |E(G)|, while the number of key
derivations will depend on the lengths of the directed paths in G. We provide a more formal account of
the functionality required of a cryptographic enforcement scheme in Sec. 2.4.
Typically, key derivation information is generated using an appropriate symmetric cryptographic
algorithm [1]: for arc xy ∈ E(G), the inputs to the cryptographic algorithm will include κ(x) and κ(y).
We write Enc(m,κ) to denote the encryption of message m with key κ. There are three very well known
ways to implement cryptographic enforcement of information flow policies [9]:
Basic – give u the set of keys {κ(x) : x 6 λ(u)};
Iterative – give u a single key κ(λ(u)) and publish {Enc(κ(x), κ(y)) : x⋖ y};
Direct – give u a single key κ(λ(u)) and publish {Enc(κ(x), κ(y)) : x < y}.
We may evaluate different implementations by considering a number of parameters. Let k(x) be the
number of keys required by a user associated with x. Then we write k to denote the maximum value
of k(x) taken over all x and K to denote
∑
x∈X k(x). We write p to denote the number of items of
public information,2 and d to denote the number of key derivation operations a user may be required to
perform to derive a key. Let n denote the cardinality of X . Then the characteristics of the three schemes
described above are summarized in Table 1.
Scheme Keys for u K k p d
Basic {κ(x) : x 6 λ(u)} n+ |E∗0 | O(n) 0 0
Iterative {κ(λ(u))} n 1 |E0| O(n)
Direct {κ(λ(u))} n 1 |E∗0 | 1
Table 1: How the parameters of various key assignment schemes vary
Naturally, there is a trade-off between the amount of public information we need to compute and store
centrally, and the number of key derivation operations that are required. The direct scheme, for example,
minimizes the cost of key derivation at the expense of an increase in public information. Consider the
example in Fig. 1: the Hasse diagram of the poset has 8 vertices and 10 arcs, and the width of the poset
is 2; the graph of the transitive closure has 23 arcs.
2It is assumed that the structure of the poset (X,6) is known to all participants of a cryptographic enforcement scheme.
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Figure 1: The Hasse diagram of a simple poset (X,6) and a chain partition
More complex schemes have been devised to reduce the number of derivation operations by increasing
|E(G)| [2, 7, 10]. In particular, Atallah et al. introduced a scheme for policies where X is a total order,
in which the number of derivation operations was no greater than 2 and |E(G)| = O(|X | log |X |) [2].
Crampton extended these ideas to arbitary interval-based access control policies [7].
2.3 Chain Partition Techniques
We may consider other ways of enforcing an information flow policy. Crampton et al. observed that
one possibility is to decompose a partially ordered set (X,6) into disjoint chains and then use one-way
functions to derive keys [8]. In this case, the arc set E(G) ⊆ E0 and the transitive closure of G (the
graph representing the chain partition) is not necessarily equal to H∗ (as illustrated in Fig. 1b, in which
deleted arcs are shown as gray dashed lines).
The advantage of such a scheme is that no public information is required. We simply select a key
for the top element in each chain and then use a (public) one-way function F to iteratively compute the
keys for the remaining elements in each chain. In particular, if x⋖ y in a chain, then κ(x) = F (κ(y)).3
Thus a user can simply derive keys by repeated applications of the one-way function. The trade-off in
this case is that the user may need as many as w keys, one for each of w chains. In Fig. 1b, for example,
a user assigned to vertex d will require κ(d) and κ(c). In short, it may be advantageous to eliminate
public information, in which case each user may require multiple keys to support key derivation.
2.4 Formalization and Constructions
Recent work has formalized the security properties required of a cryptographic enforcement scheme (CES)
for information flow policies [1, 3, 11]. Atallah et al. introduced the concepts of key recovery and key
indistinguishability [1]. The former, informally, is the requirement that a coalition of users V ⊆ U (the
“adversary”) can derive κ(x) only if there exists v ∈ V such that λ(v) > x. In other words, compromising
users cannot lead to non-derivable keys being compromised. This is, essentially, the weakest security
requirement that one might require of a CES. The schemes described in Sec. 2.2 have this property
(provided the encryption scheme has reasonable properties).
However, in the interests of integrating a CES with other cryptographic tools, the stronger notion
of indistinguishability was introduced. This property requires that the adversary cannot distinguish
between κ(x) and a random string (of the same length). The schemes discussed in Sec. 2.2 do not have
this property (see [1], for example).
Informally, treating encryption keys as “just another encrypted data object” cannot be the basis for
a robust cryptographic enforcement scheme. Specifically, the derivation of keys has to be separated from
the decryption of data objects. We achieve this by introducing a secret value σ(x) for each x ∈ X from
which κ(x) may be derived. More formally, a CES for (X,6) comprises the SetUp and Derive algorithms,
the first being used to generate keys and the data used to derive keys, and the second to derive keys.
Let K denote an arbitrary key space (typically K = {0, 1}l for some l ∈ N).
3This method is not appropriate for arbitrary posets because we may have y ⋖ x and y ⋖ z [9].
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• SetUp takes as input a security parameter ρ and a poset (X,6) associated with an information
flow policy. It outputs, for each element x ∈ X , a pair (σ(x), κ(x)): σ(x) is used to derive keys
κ(y) ∈ K, where y 6 x; and κ(x) is used to encrypt data objects associated with security label x.
The SetUp algorithm also outputs a set of public information Pub, which is used to support key
derivation.4
• Derive takes as input (X,6), Pub, start and end points x, y ∈ X and σ(x).
It outputs κ(y) ∈ K if and only if y 6 x. (In particular, κ(x) can be derived from σ(x).)
Atallah et al. described a CES in which two keys τ(x) and κ(x) are derived from σ(x) using a
pseudorandom function and (τ(y), κ(y)) is directly derivable from τ(x) only if y ⋖ x. (Thus, κ(y) is
iteratively derivable from σ(x) if x  y.) The main innovation here is to separate the derivation and
encryption functions of κ(x), meaning that knowledge of the object decryption key κ(x) does not help
in deriving κ(y). (Of course, exposure of τ(x) will allow for the derivation of τ(y) and hence κ(y).)
Freire et al. introduce a security property called strong key indistinguishability [11], which we define
formally in Fig. 4 and Definition 5 (on page 9). The adversary selects a vertex x to attack and may
then learn {σ(y) : y 6> x} (as in the security model for key indistinguishability) and {κ(y) : y 6= x}; the
adversary’s task is to distinguish κ(x) from random. They then define a CES for total orders that
has the property of strong key indistinguishability, in which a key κ(x) is derived from σ(x) using a
pseudorandom function and σ(y) is directly derivable from σ(x) only if y⋖ x. Finally, they demonstrate
how this CES can be extended to arbitrary posets using the chain partition construction described in
Sec. 2.3.
3 Tree-Based Enforcement Schemes
In this work, we are interested in enforcing an information flow policy, defined in terms of the Hasse
diagram of a partially ordered set (X,6), using cryptographic primitives. We may enforce the policy
in any way we see fit. We may, for example, increase the number of arcs (by including some subset of
the transitive arcs), thereby decreasing the lengths of the directed paths in the graph and the number
of key derivations that are required. Thus there is a trade-off between (increasing) the number of arcs
and (decreasing) the amount of storage required for public information. In particular, we could include
all transitive arcs, so that all paths are of length 1 (as in the direct scheme). Alternatively, we may
increase the number of keys given to each user and reduce the derivation time (keeping the number of
arcs constant). This corresponds to allowing the user to start from multiple points in the graph.
In practice, there may be constraints that will dictate what kind of cryptographic enforcement schemes
will be appropriate. There may be constraints, for example, on the computational power and/or storage
of the end-user devices; or it may not be possible to provide an on-line server to store public information.
As noted in Table 1, there are four parameters that are likely to be of interest: k, K, p, and d. We
may wish to minimize or impose an upper bound on one or more of these parameters. Certain choices
have been well studied, particularly those for which k = 1 (when each user is given exactly one key and
E0 ⊆ E(G) ⊆ E∗0 ). Alternatively, we can eliminate public information (by ensuring that every node has
at most one in-arc), at the expense of an increase in the number of keys assigned to each vertex. It is
these types of schemes that we consider in the remainder of this paper. In particular, we consider the
problem of minimizing K, the total number of keys required.
In the special case that the Hasse diagram H = (X,E0) is a spanning out-tree, we may use simpler
cryptographic primitives to enforce an information flow policy. Specifically, we know there is a unique
directed path from x to y whenever y < x. Hence, for all x, y ∈ X such that y ⋖ x, we define κ(y) to
be F (κ(x) ‖ y), where F is an appropriate one-way function [14] and ‖ denotes string concatenation. In
other words, keys are determined by the vertices, rather than the arcs, through which a directed path
passes. In this case, we require no public information (apart from a description of the poset), because
keys are derived only from a (secret) key and a (public) vertex label.
In general, of course, H is not an out-tree. We may assume without loss of generality, however, that
our poset has a maximum element. If (X,6) has more than one maximal element then we add a new
4In some schemes, it may be the case that κ(y) = σ(y) for all y ∈ X; and in some schemes, it may be that the set of
public information is empty.
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Figure 2: Spanning out-trees derived from the poset in Fig. 1 by arc deletion
element to X which is defined to be greater than all elements in X . (In this case, no user or object would
be assigned to such an element.) Thus, we may assume that H∗ has only one vertex of in-degree zero
and so has a spanning out-tree [4, Prop. 1.7.1].
3.1 Constructing an Enforcement Scheme
In this paper, then, we investigate ways of constructing a spanning out-tree from H∗ = (G,E∗0 ) (in order
to eliminate the need for public information) by selecting an arc set that is a subset of E∗0 . However, we
have to “repair” the Hasse diagram by allocating some users more than one key (because some of the
paths will have been “broken” by the deletion of arcs). Thus it is interesting to consider how to select
the arcs for deletion in such a way that the increase in the number of keys is minimized (either on a
per-vertex basis or in total).
Figure 2 illustrates three out-trees derived from the poset in Fig. 1a. Removing arcs to create an
out-tree inevitably means that certain paths are broken. The out-tree in Fig. 2a, for example, means
that a user associated with vertex h only requires a single key and derivation requires no more than one
hop. However, every other vertex (except a) requires additional keys in order to bridge the gaps. The
above observations motivate the following definition.
Definition 1. Given an information flow policy (X,6), E(T ) ⊆ X × X defines a derivation out-tree
T = (X,E(T )) if (i) T is a spanning out-tree; (ii) xy ∈ E(T ) implies y < x.
Lemma 1. Let D = (V,E) be an acyclic digraph with only one vertex r of in-degree zero. Then by
selecting one in-bound arc for each vertex x 6= r we obtain a spanning out-tree of D. Furthermore, any
spanning out-tree of D can be constructed in this way.
Proof. First, let us prove that T is a spanning out-tree. Clearly, T has no directed cycle and every vertex
of x 6= r has in-degree 1. It remains to show that T is connected and contains r. Consider a vertex
y1 6= r and a longest directed path of T terminating at y1: P = ytyt−1 . . . y1. Since T has no directed
cycle all vertices of P are distinct and since P is longest, yt = r. Thus, every vertex of T is reachable
from r showing that T is connected and contains r.
Now let T be a spanning out-tree. Note that for every vertex x 6= r there is exactly one arc to x.
Thus, T can be constructed by the procedure of the lemma.
If T = (X,E) is a derivation out-tree and x ≯ u, then x 6 T u. However, we may have u < x but
x 6 T u. Thus, the problem with a derivation out-tree, in the context of cryptographic enforcement
schemes, is that some authorized labels will no longer be reachable. Accordingly, we extend the notion
of a derivation out-tree to a tree-based enforcement scheme.
Definition 2. Given an information flow policy (X,6), a tree-based enforcement scheme is a pair
(T, φ), where T is a derivation out-tree and φ : X → 2X is a key allocation function such that:
• x ∈ φ(x);
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• if u 6 x then there exists z ∈ φ(x) such that z  T u;
• if u 6 x then for all z ∈ φ(x), z 6 T u.
In a tree-based enforcement scheme (T, φ), directed paths in T are used to derive secrets (and hence
keys): E(T ) determines the paths and φ determines the starting points of those paths (and hence the
set of secrets that should be given to each user). In particular, φ(x) \ {x} is a set of vertices that were
reachable from x in H∗ that are no longer reachable in T . Thus, informally, φ(x) identifies a set of
starting places in T from which all (and only those) nodes that were accessible in (X,6) from x remain
accessible in T , and |φ(x)| − 1 is the number of additional secrets that will be required by a user with
security label x.
Given a poset (X,6) with maximum element r and a derivation out-tree T = (X,E), define φE :
X → 2X , where
φE(x) =
{
{x} if x = r,
{z ∈ X : ∃y ∈ X such that yz ∈ E, x > z, x 6> y} otherwise.
We now establish that φE is the “best” tree-based enforcement scheme. First, we show that (T, φE) is
indeed a tree-based enforcement scheme. We then show that for a given tree T = (X,E), any tree-based
enforcement scheme (T, φ), and any x ∈ X , φ(x) ⊇ φE(x).
Lemma 2. For any poset (X,6) and any derivation out-tree T = (X,E), (T, φE) is a tree-based en-
forcement scheme.
Proof. We first show that x ∈ φE(x). This is trivially the case for x = r. If x is not the root vertex,
there exists y ∈ X such that yx ∈ E (since T is a derivation out-tree). Moreover, x > x and x 6> y (since
yx ∈ E implies x < y). Hence, by definition, x ∈ φE(x).
Now consider the case u < x. Since T is a derivation out-tree, there exists a path zℓzℓ−1 . . . z0 in T ,
with r = zℓ, u = z0 and ℓ > 0. If zi = x for some i then we are done (since x ∈ φE(x)). Hence, we
may assume that zi 6= x for all i. However, there exists a smallest integer m < ℓ such that x > zm and
x 6> zm+1. (If no such integer existed, we would have to conclude r > x.) By definition, zm ∈ φE(x) and
also zm  T u.
Finally, consider the case u 6 x and suppose (in order to obtain a contradiction) there exists z ∈ φE(x)
such that z  T u. Then u 6 z (by definition of a derivation out-tree and  T ) and z 6 x (by definition
of φE(x)). By transitivity, u 6 x, the desired contradiction.
Lemma 3. For any tree-based enforcement scheme (T = (X,E), φ) and every vertex x ∈ X, φ(x) ⊇
φE(x).
Proof. Clearly φ(r) ⊇ φE(r), by definition. Given x 6= r, suppose (in order to obtain a contradiction)
that z ∈ φE(x) and z 6∈ φ(x). Then, by definition of φE , there exists y ∈ X such that yz ∈ E, x > z and
x 6> y. Now, since z 6 x and (T, φ) is an enforcement scheme, there exists t ∈ φ(x) such that t  T z.
Hence t T y (since T is a tree and yz ∈ E). Therefore, y 6 t and t 6 x, since (T, φ) is an enforcement
scheme and t T t. By transitivity, x > y (the desired contradiction).
Thus, for a given tree T , (T, φE) is the enforcement scheme that minimizes, for each x ∈ X , the
number of secrets required by a user assigned to x. Hence, for a given derivation out-tree T = (X,E), it
is reasonable to assume that we will always use the enforcement scheme (T, φE). Accordingly, we define
K(T ) =
∑
x∈X
|φE(x)| .
That is K(T ) represents the total number of secrets required by a tree-based enforcement scheme based
on the derivation out-tree T . Note also that |φE(x)| denotes the number of secrets required by a user
assigned to security label x. Henceforth, given a derivation out-tree T = (X,E), we will assume we will
use the enforcement scheme (T, φE). Accordingly, we will write φ in preference to φE .
Let T = (X,E) be a derivation out-tree. Then, for y, z ∈ X such that yz ∈ E, define
γ(yz) = {x ∈ X : x > z, x 6> y} .
As we will see in Lemma 4 and Sec. 4, there is a strong connection between φ and γ, which we can use
to compute a tree-based enforcement scheme efficiently.
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Lemma 4. Let (X,6) be an information flow policy and let T = (X,E) be a derivation out-tree. Then
φ can be computed in time O(|X |2).
Proof. By definition, φ(x) = {z ∈ X : ∃y ∈ X such that yz ∈ E, x > z, x 6> y}, for any x not equal to r
in X . Moreover, there is a single arc in E of the form yz, for any z ∈ X , since T is a derivation out-tree.
Thus, an algorithm to compute φ comprises an outer loop which iterates through the elements of X and
an inner loop that iterates through the elements of E, where each iteration of the inner loop for arc yz
tests whether x > z and x 6> y. We can compute the adjacency matrix of H∗ in time O(|X |2), which we
can use to test whether x > z (and x 6> y) in constant time. Moreover, |E| = |X | − 1 (since every vertex
except the root has in-degree 1). Thus our algorithm runs in time O(|X |2).
3.2 Generating Keys
We now describe how to instantiate a tree-based enforcement scheme for (X,6), given a derivation out-
tree T = (X,E), using a pseudorandom function (PRF). The scheme is a natural extension of the one used
by Freire et al. for total orders [11].5 Let ρ be a security parameter and F : {0, 1}ρ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ρ
be a PRF (as formally introduced in Section 3.3).
SetUp: The inputs to the algorithm are ρ and a derivation out-tree T = (X,E) for (X,6), with root
vertex r.
Select secret value s(r) uniformly at random from {0, 1}ρ. Set
κ(r)
def
= F (s(r), r) (1)
and, recursively, if y is a child of vertex x (in T ), set
s(y)
def
= F (s(x), y) (2)
κ(y)
def
= F (s(y), y) (3)
Thus, for xy ∈ E, s(y) is derived from s(x) and the label of y, while κ(y) is derived from s(y) and
the label of y.
Finally, define σ(x) = {s(y) : y ∈ φ(x)}.
Derive: Given y, x and σ(x), with y 6 x, there (uniquely) exists z ∈ φ(x) such that z  T y.
If z = y, then (since s(z) ∈ σ(x)), compute κ(z) = F (s(z), z). If z 6= y, then for each intermediate
vertex ti on the path t1 . . . tm between t1 = z and tm = y, compute s(ti) = F (s(ti−1), ti). Finally,
compute κ(y) = F (s(y), y).
Our method for generating secrets is illustrated in Fig. 3.
3.3 Security Analysis
We start by specifying what we understand by a PRF. Our definition is not the most general possible
and is tailored to the requirements of our construction (as described in Sec. 3.2); specifically, we assume
that the keyspace and range of the PRF are the same set.
Definition 3. A pseudorandom function (Fρ)ρ∈N is a family of efficient functions Fρ : K×{0, 1}
∗ → K,
where we understand ρ as a security parameter and K = {0, 1}ρ as the keyspace.
We will usually write Fρ,K(x) to denote Fρ(K,x) for any K ∈ K. To further simplify the notation,
we will omit ρ when no confusion can arise. We write DO ⇒ 1 to denote a configuration where D is a
probabilistic poly-time Turing machine that has oracle access to a function O and outputs a bit with
value 1.
5In the special case of a total order, we obtain the scheme of Freire et al, modulo some differences in the choice of the
second input to the PRF.
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s(a) = F (s(c), a)
s(b) = F (s(d), b) s(c) = F (s(d), c)
s(d) = F (s(g), d) s(e) = F (s(g), e)
s(f) = F (s(h), f) s(g) = F (s(h), g)
s(h)
Figure 3: The secrets generated for the spanning-out-tree in Fig. 2c
Exptkist,bX,x,A(1
ρ):
1 (Pub, σ¯, κ¯)←R SetUp(1ρ, (X,6))
2 K0 ←R K
3 K1 ← κ(x)
4 b′ ←R A((X,6), x,Pub,CorruptX,x,KeysX,x,Kb)
5 Return b′
Figure 4: Security experiment for strong key indistinguishability
Definition 4. Given a pseudorandom function F , we define the advantage of a distinguisher D to be
AdvFD(ρ) =
∣∣∣Pr[K ←R K;DFK(·) ⇒ 1]− Pr[ϕ←R 〈{0, 1}∗ → K〉;Dϕ(·) ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
where 〈{0, 1}∗ → K〉 denotes the universe of all functions mapping {0, 1}∗ to K. We say F is indistin-
guishable from a random function if the advantage of any efficient distinguisher D is negligible.
We next make precise the level of security that we target. We refer to [1, 11] for recent discussions
and comparisons of security models that are specific enough to allow the analysis of CESs using the
formalisms of provable security. We reproduce here the strongest model from [11]; that is, the one
formalising the highest level of security, which is based on the security experiment Exptkist,bX,x,A(1
ρ) defined
in Fig. 4. We write σ¯ and κ¯ to denote, respectively, vectors that list the values σ(x) and κ(x) for all
x ∈ X .
Definition 5. Let (X,6) be an arbitrary poset. A CES for (X,6) is strongly key indistinguishable with
respect to static adversaries if, for all x ∈ X, the advantage of all efficient adversaries A that interact
in experiment ExptkistX,x,A is negligible, where we define
AdvkistX,x,A(ρ) =
∣∣∣Pr [Exptkist,1X,x,A(1ρ)⇒ 1]− Pr [Exptkist,0X,x,A(1ρ)⇒ 1]∣∣∣
and set CorruptX,x = {σ(v) : v ∈ X, x 6 v} and KeysX,x = {κ(v) : v ∈ X \ {x}}.
Observe that in this definition, and in contrast to other models discussed in [1, 11], the adversary
obtains, in principle, all secrets embedded in the system (that is, all σ(x) and κ(x) values), excluding
only those that would allow distinguishing the target key by trivial means (e.g., by invoking the Derive
algorithm).6
6A variant of Definition 5 would consider dynamic adversaries: such an adversary is able to choose the challenge label
x during the experiment, rather than having it fixed as one of the experiment’s parameters. However, it has been shown
that static and dynamic definitions of key indistinguishability are polynomially equivalent [11]. To simplify the exposition,
therefore, we restrict our attention to the static case.
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The final step of our analysis is to prove that our tree-based enforcement scheme from Sec. 3.2 is
strongly key indistinguishable. Observe that this implies that our scheme is secure in all the models
considered in [1, 11]. More formally, we have the following result.
Theorem 1. Our tree-based enforcement scheme is strongly key indistinguishable in the sense of Defi-
nition 5. More precisely, for any poset (X,6), x ∈ X, and efficient adversary A, there exists a constant
0 6 c 6 |X | and efficient distinguishers D01 , . . . ,D
0
c , D
1
1 , . . . ,D
1
c against the underlying PRF such that
AdvkistX,x,A 6 Adv
F
D0
1
+ · · ·+AdvFD0
c
+AdvFD1
1
+ · · ·+AdvFD1
c
.
4 Minimizing K in a Tree-based Enforcement Scheme
So far, we have shown that it is possible to construct a tree-based enforcement scheme for an information
flow policy (X,6) that is strongly key indistinguishable. As we observed before, we will usually require
our tree-based enforcement scheme to have some particular properties, such as minimizing the total
number of keys or ensuring that all derivation paths are no longer than some threshold value. Hence, we
require an algorithm to compute a derivation out-tree that satisfies the desired requirements, since, by
Lemma 4, we can then compute the associated key allocation function φ in polynomial time.
In this section, we consider two questions: how to minimize K, the total number of keys allocated to
vertices (by the key allocation function φ); and how to minimize K̂, the total number of keys distributed
to users. The second question is interesting because, in practice, we might want to reduce the exposure
of keys by ensuring that very few keys are associated with vertices to which many users are assigned. We
solve both questions, demonstrating that it is surprisingly efficient to compute the required tree-based
enforcement schemes in polynomial time. This is possible because of the connection between φ and γ,
which leads to Theorem 2. We then state and prove Theorem 3, the main result of this section.
Our basic approach is to define a weight for each arc in E∗0 and construct a minimum weight spanning
out-tree. Accordingly, given an information flow policy ((X,6), λ, U,O), where λ : U ∪O → X, let
U(x) = {u ∈ U : λ(u) = x}, and let H = (X,E0) be the Hasse diagram of X . Then we define the weight
function ω : E∗0 → N, where
ω(yz)
def
=
∑
x∈γ(yz)
|U(x)| .
Theorem 2. Let (T = (X,E), φ) be any tree-based enforcement scheme for (X,6). Then∑
x∈X
x 6=r
|U(x)| · |φ(x)| =
∑
e∈E
ω(e).
Proof. By definition, we have, for every x 6= r,
|φ(x)| = |{yz ∈ E : x ∈ γ(yz)}|
and so
|U(x)| · |φ(x)| = |U(x)| · |{yz ∈ E : x ∈ γ(yz)}| .
Hence ∑
x∈X
x 6=r
|U(x)| · |φ(x)| =
∑
x∈X
x 6=r
|U(x)| · |yz ∈ E : x ∈ γ(yz)|
and, since r 6∈ γ(yz) for any yz ∈ E, we have∑
x∈X
x 6=r
|U(x)| · |φ(x)| =
∑
yz∈E
∑
x∈γ(yz)
|U(x)| =
∑
yz∈E
ω(yz).
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Theorem 3. Given an information flow policy ((X,6), U,O, λ), we can compute a tree-based enforce-
ment scheme (T, φ) such that K̂ is minimized in time O(|E∗0 |+ |X |
2
).
Proof. For brevity, we write E for E(T ). By Theorem 2,
K̂ = |U(r)|+
∑
e∈E
ω(e).
An algorithm to compute the weight function ω iterates through the arcs in E∗0 and, for a given arc yz,
iterates through all x in X testing whether x > z and x 6> y. In other words, we swap the inner and
outer loops in the algorithm used in the proof of Lemma 4. Thus, we can compute ω in time O(|X |2).
Since |U(r)| is fixed, we minimize K̂ by computing a derivation out-tree that minimizes
∑
e∈E ω(e).
By Lemma 1, we can achieve this by selecting, for each non-root vertex x ∈ X , the minimum weight
arc to x, where the weights are given by ω. We need only consider each arc (in E∗0 ) once, which takes
time O(|E∗0 |). The resulting set of arcs forms a spanning out-tree of minimum weight and the number
of additional keys required is
∑
e∈E ω(e). We can derive the associated key allocation function in time
O(|X |2), by Lemma 4; the result follows.
Corollary 1. Given an information flow policy ((X,6), U,O, λ), we can compute a tree-based enforce-
ment scheme such that K is minimized in time O(|E∗0 |+ |X |
2
).
Corollary 2. We can find, in time O(|E∗0 |+ |X |
3/2 |E∗0 |
1/2
), a minimum weight spanning out-tree that
has the minimum number of leaves among such trees.
It is useful to find a minimum weight spanning out-tree with a minimum number of leaves because
the number of leaves will impose an upper bound on |φ(x)|. Note, however, that |φ(x)| may be greater
than the width of X (and it is not difficult to construct such an example). This is because the set of arcs
in the graph that is input to MinLeaf – the algorithm used to construct the spanning out-tree – will,
in general, be a strict subset of E∗0 . Thus, the size of the maximal independent set in the graph that
is input to MinLeaf can exceed the width of the poset (which is the equal to the size of the maximal
independent set in G = (X,E∗0 )).
We now prove some further properties of γ. This enables us to reduce the running time of our
algorithm because we show it is sufficient to consider only arcs in E0 (rather than E
∗
0 ) when constructing
the minimum weight spanning out-tree.
Lemma 5. Let (X,6) be a partially ordered set. Then for all x, y, z ∈ X such that z < y < x,
γ(xy) ∩ γ(yz) = ∅ and γ(xz) ⊇ γ(yz) ∪ γ(xy)
Corollary 3. Let (X,6) be a partially ordered set with Hasse diagram H = (X,E0). Then, for any path
x1x2 . . . xp in H
∗, p > 2, we have
ω(x1xp) >
p−1∑
i=1
ω(xixi+1).
Corollary 4. Let (X,6) be a partially ordered set with Hasse diagram H = (X,E0). Then there exists
a minimum weight spanning out-tree T = (X,E) with E ⊆ E0.
Corollary 5. We can compute a tree-based enforcement scheme for information flow policy (X,6) in
time O(|E0|+ |X |
2
).
Remark 1. In practice, we expect that |U(x)| > 0, although our proofs do not make this assumption. If
we do make this assumption, it is possible to strengthen the statement in Corollary 4 and assert that a
minimum weight spanning out-tree can only contain arcs from the Hasse diagram.
Fig. 5 illustrates the construction of the minimum weight spanning out-tree for the poset in Fig. 1
(assuming there is a single user for each vertex). The weight on arc ec is 3, for example, because
γ(ec) = {c, d, f}. (The effect of retaining arc ec would be that κ(c) would be required for each of c, d
and f . Equivalently, c ∈ φ(d) and c ∈ φ(f) if we were to choose ec to belong to our derivation out-tree.)
To construct a minimum weight spanning out-tree, we must select arcs ca and dc (and we select one or
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(a) Weights on arcs
a
b c
d e
f g
h
(b) Derivation out-tree
Figure 5: The minimum weight derivation tree for Fig. 1
other of fd and gd). One possible scheme, when gd is retained rather than fd is illustrated in Fig. 5b;
the scheme requires a total of 11 keys, being the sum of the weights on the retained arcs plus an extra
one for the root vertex.
Remark 2. Our construction will almost always require fewer keys than a scheme based on chain par-
titions. This follows by noting that any vertex x, such that x > y, x > z and {y, z} is an antichain,
necessarily requires (at least) two keys in a chain partition scheme, but this is not necessarily true of our
construction (since the derivation tree may include many antichains). Consider the chain partition in
Fig. 1b and the derivation tree in Fig. 5b. The former would require 13 keys, while the latter only 11.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new form of cryptographic scheme for the enforcement of information
flow policies. Our scheme has the advantage that no public information is required for the derivation
of decryption keys. Moreover, our tree-based scheme requires fewer keys (when X is not a total order),
compared to existing chain-based approaches, to enforce a given policy. Nevertheless, our scheme retains
the strong security properties that have recently been established for chain-based schemes [11]. From a
practical perspective, we provide an efficient algorithm for computing an optimal derivation tree, in the
sense that it requires the smallest number of keys. This is in sharp contrast to chain-based approaches,
which provide no guidance on how best to select a chain partition of the poset (of which there may be
many) nor provide a way of computing the number of keys required for a given partition. Thus, there
are particular practical advantages to using a tree-based approach.
There are several interesting opportunities for future work. From a mathematical perspective, it
would be interesting to establish the minimum total number of keys required by a chain-based scheme
and, if possible, to quantify the benefits offered by a tree-based scheme. This is, however, likely to be
non-trivial, as it is not clear that there exists a weight function for chain-based schemes that can be
used to formulate a result analogous to Theorem 2. From a more practical perspective, it would be
interesting to find an algorithm that can compute a derivation tree such that(i) no user requires more
than w keys, where w is the width of the poset (ii) the total number of keys is as small as possible. In
particular, such a construction may be useful in scenarios where the user devices have limited secure
storage for keys. Our preliminary work on this problem suggests that no efficient algorithm exists, but
whether it is an NP-hard problem remains open. We also intend to investigate whether a forest-based
enforcement scheme, which would share some of the characteristics of tree- and chain-based schemes,
would offer advantages in terms of reducing(i) the maximum number of steps required for key derivation
(ii) the administrative effort required following key revocation (since we can limit key updates to those
vertices within a tree in the forest). In Fig. 5b, for example, we could delete arc gd to yield a forest of
two trees: each user assigned to vertex h or g would require an additional key (κ(d)) but worst-case key
derivation would require two, rather than four, hops.
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